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1 Introduction
Labour represents the productive energy of human
beings and labour markets, broadly defined,
represent the institutions that channel this energy
throughout society. Therefore, labour and labour
markets are of paramount importance to the
functioning of any economy. Yet, the theories that
dominate the formulation of economic policies
reflect an imagined world that bears little
resemblance to employment dynamics on the
ground. The consequences of this elaborate fiction
are not trivial. The ways in which labour markets are
conceptualised determines, to no small extent, the
outcomes predicted by macroeconomic models, the
perceived scope for social protection, and the
potential for purposeful interventions to improve
material wellbeing. This article explores the
fundamental issues at stake in theorising labour
markets and explains why a failure to rethink labour
markets would compromise the development of
meaningful macroeconomic and social policies.
2 Labour markets and macroeconomics
Macroeconomic predictions critically depend on how
the labour market is theorised. If we change the
conceptualisation of the labour market, we change
the nature of the macroeconomy. This, in turn, has
enormous implications for formulating macroeconomic
policies and for evaluating their welfare impacts with
regard to employment, average living standards, and
the distribution of the value of output.
The intellectual history of macroeconomics is filled
with examples of the intimate relationship between
labour markets and the predictions of macro-theory.
Keynes’ critique of the ‘Classical Economics’ is a case
in point. Classical economists, such as Pigou, argued
that expansionary policies would have no long-run
impact on the level of employment and, as a
consequence, the real value of output (Pigou 1968:
248–51). According to Pigou, labour supply dynamics
ensure that real wages rise in response to the
heightened level of aggregate demand, preventing
an overall increase in the level of employment.1 More
contemporary macro-theories, including those of
the New Classical literature, echo this earlier logic. In
contrast, Keynes argues that labour supply responds
to money wages while labour demand reacts to real
wages (Keynes 1964: Ch. 2). Under these
assumptions, both labour demand and labour supply
will increase in response to expansionary policies,
leading to a higher equilibrium level of employment
and output. A central debate in macroeconomics –
can expansionary policies affect employment and real
output – hinges on the nature of the labour market.
In macroeconomic models of developing countries, a
surplus labour market is often assumed, along the
lines of the one described by Lewis (1954). In contrast
to both Classical and Keynesian models, labour supply
is perfectly elastic in a labour-surplus economy.
Formal sector employers draw from a reserve army
of labour without bidding up wages. The ‘surplus’
workers are engaged in informal, subsistence or
survivalist activities. Expressed another way, the
surplus labour model treats informal employment as
an undifferentiated residual with no barriers to entry.
Under these conditions, non-labour constraints (e.g. a
scarcity of capital) determine the level of economic
output and formal employment. Expansionary
macroeconomic policy will only impact output and
employment to the extent that it relaxes the binding
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supply-side constraint. Again, the effectiveness of
macroeconomic policy depends, to a significant
extent, on the presumed nature of the labour market.
The point is not to debate the relative merits of the
Classical, Keynesian, Lewis, or any other competing
labour market model and choose the best of the lot.
Instead, these examples illustrate a basic proposition:
macroeconomic relationships depend on how labour
markets are theorised and the nature of these
relationships has significant consequences for policy
analysis.
This discussion provokes a follow-up question: If
good macroeconomics relies on a proper
conceptualisation of the labour market, which labour
market model is the correct one? None of the
models discussed here fits the bill. For example,
studies of informal employment in developing
countries suggest that, contrary to the surplus labour
approach, informal activities are heterogenous and
barriers to entry limit labour mobility within the
informal economy and between formal and informal
forms of employment. The Classical and Keynesian
models presuppose a dominant wage labour market,
but in many countries self-employment cannot be
ignored. An alternative framework for theorising
labour markets is needed; one that reflects the
actual relationships and employment structures
observed. Unfortunately, a comprehensive theory
along these lines remains underdeveloped.
3 The tyranny of the perfectly competitive
labour market
The dominant strategy currently in vogue among
policymakers is the pursuit of ‘labour market
flexibility’ to realise higher levels of employment and
improved rates of growth. Labour market flexibility is
a catch-all term for a withdrawal of state regulation,
for a shift away from social protections which
ostensibly introduce market distortions, and for a
reduced role for collective action, specifically on the
part of trade unions and other worker organisations.
The rationale for adopting this strategy of
flexibility–liberalisation rests on the ideal of the
perfectly competitive labour market – in which
employers and employees have complete freedom to
voluntarily establish optimal employment
relationships in a competitive environment. Any
movement away from this ideal distorts the
functioning of labour markets and will lead to a
misallocation of productive resources – ultimately
producing slower growth and lower levels of
employment, or so the argument goes.
The perfectly competitive labour market model, as
formulated in neoclassical theory, has enormous
implications for macroeconomic and social
protection policies. Under its influence,
macroeconomic policies become impotent in altering
real economic outcomes, since employers and
workers respond rationally to policy changes so as to
keep employment at its ‘natural’ or market-clearing
level. Social protection policies that affect labour
market dynamics, for example minimum wages or
certain forms of employment insurance, create
distortions that, by definition, reduce aggregate
welfare.
The idea of a perfectly competitive market is also
implied in many dualist approaches to labour market
dynamics and informality. In one variation of the dual
labour market, distortions in the formal labour market
cause job opportunities to be rationed. Those who
cannot find formal sector jobs work informally. Since
barriers to informal employment are assumed to be
non-existent, informal labour markets more closely
conform to the competitive ideal, although crowding
in informal employment may push informal earnings
lower than they otherwise would have been.
The perfectly competitive model makes for pat policy
solutions, but it firmly belongs to the realm of
theoretical make-believe. Non-regulatory market
failures are legion in all labour markets. For example,
for the perfectly competitive labour market model to
exist at all, transaction costs must be zero (Kaufman
2007; Jacobsen and Skillman 2004). However, labour
market participation involves real costs in terms of
time, effort, and financial resources. Employers incur
costs when filling vacancies, managing human
resources, and monitoring their workforces. The
informally self-employed often face costs in securing
viable workplaces in urban centres or accessing
markets.
The neoclassical model assumes that labour markets
are complete in the sense that all contingencies can
be identified and specified in an employment
contract, and that such contracts are costlessly
enforceable. Incomplete markets and imperfect
information cause employment outcomes to deviate
from the perfectly competitive ideal and can affect
the distribution of power in economic transactions
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(Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984; Bowles 1985). In efficiency
wage models, for example, the prevailing wage rate
is kept above the market clearing level in order to
elicit greater effort from the workforce. Put another
way, when productivity and earnings are correlated,
there may be limits to profitable wage reductions on
the part of employers.
In the perfectly competitive model, employed
workers are indifferent to remaining in their current
employment situation. Market clearing guarantees
that they can find employment in an equivalent
position if they choose to leave. In reality, workers are
usually fearful of losing their jobs. Individuals are not
faced with an endless stream of offers for equally
lucrative opportunities. When real earnings fall – for
example, due to unexpected inflation or an economic
setback – most workers do not quit, they may even
buckle down and work harder (Kaufman 2007).
When working people place a value on remaining in
their current position, employers enjoy a degree of
market power when negotiating the conditions of
employment (Manning 2003). An asymmetric
distribution of power violates the assumptions
needed for perfect labour markets to exist.
Issues of power are also relevant for the informally
self-employed. For example, self-employed
individuals engaged in subcontracted production
operate in a competitive environment but depend on
a large buyer for market access. This creates an
asymmetric distribution of market power which
determines the distributive dynamics of the
relationship (Milberg 2004; Heintz 2006). Similarly,
informal retailers may depend on a single large
supplier for the goods they sell, leading to a similar
unequal distribution of market power. These types of
market failures are not caused by excessive
government intervention, but rather emanate from
the institutional setting in which informal
employment relationships operate.
On the labour supply side, workers often face
barriers to entry and limitations to mobility due to
segmented labour markets. Researchers working in
the tradition of dual labour markets have long
accepted that labour markets are divided into formal
and informal segments, with barriers to mobility
between the two. However, labour market
segmentation can also exist within informal forms of
employment (Günther and Launov 2006; Chen et al.
2005). If informal employment is segmented, it
complicates the mainstream analysis of informality.
Segmentation implies heterogeneity within the
informal economy and, therefore, the concept of
informal employment as an undifferentiated residual
must be rejected. Similarly, segmentation of informal
employment implies barriers to entry that exist even
when formal regulations and social protections are
absent.
Labour supply behaviour – for example, the decision
whether to participate in the paid labour force –
frequently deviates from the predictions of
neoclassical theory. According to the standard
model, workers make a choice between the
marginal satisfaction they get from more
employment income and their enjoyment of
additional leisure time. As average earnings increase,
the implicit cost of leisure rises, and more time is
dedicated to paid employment. Labour supply
therefore rises and falls with the wage rate.
However, empirical studies have documented an
increase in labour force participation – particularly
among women – when average real earnings have
fallen (McKenzie 2004; Aslanbeigui and Summerfield
2000; Cerrutti 2000). This suggests that labour
supply and earnings may be negatively correlated,
particularly among low-income households (Spencer
2006). Faced with lower earnings, household
members increase their labour supply in an effort to
make ends meet. This occurs because households
must meet the fixed costs of their basic needs
(housing, food, energy, etc.) if they are to sustain and
reproduce themselves. Neoclassical models – by
focusing exclusively on marginal changes and
decisions modelled at the individual, not household,
level – assumes away the fixed costs of maintaining
households as social institutions. Joan Robinson
provides an early critique of neoclassical labour
supply models in her writings:
The individual breadwinner without private means
can never be in a position to refuse to work
because real wages are too low to be worth the
effort. He must earn what he can get or starve …
It is commonly found that hours become longer
and the number of workers in a family greater as
real wage rates fall.
(Robinson 1937: 11–12)
This article has focused on the shortcomings of the
perfectly competitive labour market model at some
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length, largely because the implications are so critical
for macroeconomic and social policies. If we reject
the perfectly competitive model of neoclassical
economics, macroeconomic policy has the potential
to influence real outcomes – including the level of
employment, the quality of remunerative work, and
long-run economic performance. Similarly,
appropriate social protection policies – even those
that directly affect labour market dynamics – have the
potential to enhance welfare. Moreover, barriers that
prevent informal workers from maximising the return
they get for their labour can be acknowledged to
exist and appropriate responses formulated based on
relevant research. This in no way suggests that
currently existing labour market regulations are
necessarily the most desirable or that there are no
constraints to macroeconomic stimulus. Rather, it is
being argued here that a policy framework founded
on an unreformed neoclassical labour market model
will likely reach erroneous conclusions.
In addition, if real labour markets differ substantially
from the standard neoclassical model, then pursuing
an agenda of labour market flexibility can produce
perverse outcomes. For example, removing labour
regulations and rolling back social protections could
cause an increase in labour supply – if such actions
squeezed household resources. Similarly, there may
not be a strong employment response, if contracts
are imperfect and there are limits to profitable wage
reductions. The net result of labour market flexibility
could be a rise in unemployment (due to greater
labour force participation) or growing informality. This
outcome is not necessarily inevitable nor does all
labour market reform generate unintended
consequences but, to adequately assess the impact of
increased ‘flexibility’, we need a credible framework
for understanding how labour markets work.
Ironically, models of imperfect labour markets
abound in the economics literature, and not just
among heterodox practitioners or the radical fringe
of the discipline. Despite a well-developed critique,
even among many in the mainstream, rarely do these
theoretical insights alter the dominant policy
prescriptions in a meaningful way. The integration of
informal employment and appropriate social
protection remains underdeveloped. The critiques,
such as those developed by the so-called ‘New
Keynesians’ and other, less orthodox, economists
dedicated to establishing the limits of markets,
explain why markets fail to work as expected. These
writers, however, have been less effective at
developing an array of policy alternatives, based on a
rethinking of labour markets, that gels into a
coherent framework.
One additional challenge concerns the term ‘labour
markets’ itself. Often labour markets refer exclusively
to wage labour markets, in which an employer hires
an employee for a specified wage. This approach
excludes the self-employed and effectively drives a
wedge between the idea of labour markets and a
comprehensive treatment of employment.2 This
article defines the concept of labour markets broadly
to include the set of all institutions that influence
the conditions and terms under which labour is
exchanged. Many of the self-employed – particularly
if we exclude employers and focus only on own-
account workers – are effectively selling their labour
services, since labour is the dominant factor of
production these workers have at their disposal.
However, the value of labour services provided by
the self-employed is realised through other market
transactions, apart from the wage labour market.
The broader definition of labour markets proposed
here includes all employed persons whose
employment income is predominantly comprised of
the returns to their labour, regardless of whether
these returns are realised on a wage labour market
or through some other transaction.
One implication of adopting a broader definition of
labour markets is that the conceptual framework
based on the dichotomy of ‘labour demand’ and
‘labour supply’ may no longer be universally
operational. For example, in the typical
demand/supply framework, the self-employed must
be considered both buyers and sellers of their own
labour. This could be interpreted to imply that the
self-employed are economic schizophrenics, at war
with themselves as to where their self-interest lies.
More to the point, it suggests that the traditional
apparatus for theorising labour markets – with its
intersecting supply-and-demand curves – will need
to be reformed to adequately capture the
employment relationships that dominate the labour
markets of developing countries.
4 Labour as a produced factor of production
An often-heard mantra is that macro-policies should
create an environment conducive to sustainable
long-run growth. But how is long-run growth
theorised and where does labour fit in?
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In the first generation of neoclassical growth models,
capital is the only produced factor of production
(Solow 1958). A certain fraction of output was set
aside for investment in capital goods. The resulting
growth equilibrium was depicted as a steady-state in
which the amount of output saved for investment
was sufficient to keep the capital stock growing in
proportion to other factors of production (e.g.
labour). The growth rate of the other factors of
production – which often included an abstract
variable for technology – were exogenously
determined. Endogenous growth theory extended
the basic Solow model and introduced technology as
another produced factor of production (Romer
1990). Labour remained exogenous to the model.
Other models include human capital as a produced
factor of production, in which individuals could make
productive investments in their own skills and
education (Mankiw et al. 1992). Yet again, the
workforce itself was determined by dynamics outside
the market economy.
Workers do not spring into existence, fully formed
and ready to toil. Real economic resources go into
producing human beings. The economic inputs
include marketed goods and services (a fraction of
gross domestic product (GDP) is dedicated to raising
children) and non-market goods and services (such as
those produced with unpaid care work). The
coordination of these inputs to produce human
beings takes place in numerous settings and
institutional forms, including the household, public
institutions (e.g. schools), kinship networks,
communities, and markets (e.g. for food, shelter and
paid care). How well these institutions do at
producing quality human beings will have an impact
on long-run economic growth. In short, labour
should not be treated as exogenous in
macroeconomic models – it too is a produced factor
of production.
Treating labour as a produced factor of production
allows social protection, and more generally social
policy, to contribute to the macroeconomics of long-
run growth. Many of the institutions responsible for
producing human beings are themselves the objects
of social policies – including educational and health
services. Social protections for working people have
an impact on the production of human potential. For
example, well-designed maternity and paternity leave
policies can change the allocation of resources to
support better child outcomes by mitigating labour
market penalties. Similarly, public childcare
programmes help resolve work–family conflicts.
Social insurance programmes for both formal and
informal workers can protect income when a family
member falls ill and therefore help sustain
households in the face of an unexpected shock. In
short, social policies and social protections can
contribute to macroeconomic performance, but it
requires a change of mindset in which the
production of human resources becomes integral to
the functioning of the economy.
5 Employment and the distributive
consequences of macroeconomic policies
In recent years, much attention has been paid to the
idea of ‘pro-poor growth’ – that is, growth which
reduces poverty or disproportionately benefits the
poor.3 The central innovation of the pro-poor
agenda, relative to policies that simply strive to
maximise growth, is that the distributive
consequences of a policy regime must be taken into
account. Most people receive the majority of the
income required to sustain themselves and their
dependants through some form of employment.
Moreover, the factor of production which most poor
households command in abundance is labour.
Although age, disability and illness create labour
shortages in specific cases, most low-income
households are not labour-constrained. They are
more likely to be constrained in terms of access to
other productive resources such as land, capital,
financial assets, public infrastructure, and skills.
Therefore, anything that raises the returns to labour
will raise living standards of the poor and thereby
reduce poverty.
The capacity to achieve ‘pro-poor growth’ depends
on the structure of employment, the nature of labour
markets, and relationship between macroeconomic
policy and employment outcomes. For example,
growth does not always yield more formal sector jobs
– as countries that have experienced bouts of ‘jobless
growth’ have demonstrated. Equally important, faster
growth may not translate into reduced poverty in
highly segmented labour markets. When poor
workers face barriers to their mobility, they may be
unable to take advantage of new employment
opportunities that arise.
Similarly, the supply-side impact of macroeconomic
policies depends on the nature of existing productive
relationships. Expansionary policies that increase
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demand can also have an impact on the supply-side.
Consider an informal street trader. Her productivity is
determined by the quantity of retail services she
supplies within a given time period. However, the
supply of retail services is demand-constrained. Raise
aggregated demand and the productivity of many
informal workers increases. Greater productivity
leads to higher returns to labour and, ultimately,
results in ‘pro-poor growth.’
These examples suggest that achieving ‘pro-poor
growth’ and designing macroeconomic policy
regimes that reduce inequalities require a realistic
understanding of the structure of employment and
the functioning of labour markets. Under the
assumptions of the perfect labour market – whether
they are called Classical, neoclassical, or New
Classical – fiscal and monetary policies have no
supply-side effects, barriers to entry do not exist, and
full employment is obtained in the absence of
government interference. This implies that any liberal
growth regime will be pro-poor, provided that it is
not accompanied by market distortions. However,
when we deviate from this ideal form, there is
greater scope for economic policies to specifically
target distributive outcomes – and to entertain the
possibility that distributive outcomes can impact
macroeconomic performance.
6 A call for action
This article has argued that how we conceptualise
labour markets will profoundly influence our
understanding of macroeconomics, growth, and
social policy. The theory of labour markets represents
a contested terrain and the current imperial ruler
appears to be the neoclassical perfectly competitive
model. This is unfortunate, since other approaches
exist, are compelling and hold great promise.
Perhaps the most critical challenge is to unite these
alternatives into a common, coherent framework –
and then insert this new approach into
macroeconomic models and social policy analysis. The
end result would be transformative. Clearly, there is
an enormous need to revisit our thinking about
labour markets – the stakes are too high to allow the
current situation to continue. Therefore, this article
concludes with a call to action – to marshal the
collective energies of dedicated researchers,
theorists, and scholars to formulate an innovative
approach to ‘real’ labour markets that promises to
change the way we think about economic policy.
Heintz Revisiting Labour Markets: Implications for Macroeconomics and Social Protection16
Notes
1 For example, Pigou writes about the labour
supply response (i.e. ‘real-wage rates stipulated
for, by workpeople’) to expansionary fiscal policy
as follows: ‘But eventually wage-rates may be
expected to adjust themselves to the new
demand situation and, when they have done so,
the benefit to employment will be exhausted’
(Pigou 1968: 248, 250).
2 Often, the self-employed are classified as
‘entrepreneurs’ or ‘producers’ and not ‘workers’.
However, the concepts of an ‘employee’ and an
‘independent contractor’ are closely related and
can be arbitrary. Firms can choose to hire
employees to perform a set of tasks or to
contract out the same set of tasks to an
independent contractor. Ex post, the same set of
labour services may be exchanged, although the
institutional form of the exchange is different.
Simon (1951) argues that wage employment will
be dominant as an institutional form when both
employers and employees find it advantageous to
agree upon a wage in advance but allow the
employer discretion to dictate the future activities
to be undertaken, subject to certain limits. In
contrast, a contracting relationship will dominate
when it is advantageous to specify the services to
be provided in advance (e.g. as is the case with
industrial outwork and other modern forms of
subcontracted production).
3 These two definitions of ‘pro-poor growth’ are
not equivalent.
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